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Abstract
Accelerating Turing machines are devices with the same computational structure as Turing
machines (TM), but able to perform super-tasks. We ask whether performing super-tasks alone
produces more computational power; for example, whether accelerating TM can solve the halting
problem. We conclude that this is not the case. No accelerating TM solves the halting problem.
The argument rests on an analysis of the reasoning that leads to Thomson’s paradox. The key
point is that the paradox rests on a con1ation of di2erent perspectives of accelerating processes.
This leads to concluding that the same con1ation underlies the claim that accelerating TM can
solve the halting problem.
c© 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
A super-task involves carrying out in7nitely many actions during a 7nite interval of
time. One sort of super-tasks is implicit in Zeno’s paradoxes. Another is suggested by
Blake [3], Weyl [27], and Russell [20], who all consider the same form of temporal
pattering. Weyl, for example, conceives a machine that would complete “an in7nite
sequence of distinct acts of decision within a 7nite amount of time; say by supplying
the 7rst result after 12 min, the second after another
1
4 min, the third
1
8 min later than
the second, etc.” (p. 42). The concerns below are with devices, having the same static
and operational structure as Turing machines (TM), called accelerating Turing ma-
chines, and able to perform super-tasks. Accelerating TM exhibit the temporal pattering
described by Weyl. They are discussed in [4,7,14,15,22].
E-mail address: shagrir@cc.huji.ac.il (O. Shagrir).
0304-3975/$ - see front matter c© 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2003.12.007
106 O. Shagrir / Theoretical Computer Science 317 (2004) 105–114
Unlike the ‘ordinary’ TM, accelerating TM can complete in7nitely many steps within
a 7nite span of time. But do they have more computational power? Do they solve, for
example, the halting problem? I argue that they do not. There are accelerating devices
that compute the halting function, but none of those is a TM.
2. Accelerating TM
The notion of a TM, introduced by Turing [25] in his classic 1936 paper, is often
taken to be the model of a computing machine. The details of the machine are well-
known, but a statement of Turing is useful for our forthcoming polemic:
[The machine] is only capable of a 7nite number of conditions q1; q2; : : : ; qR which
will be called “m-con7gurations”. The machine is supplied with a “tape”: : :running
through it, and divided into sections (called “squares”) each capable of bearing a
“symbol”. At any moment there is just one square, say the r-th, bearing the symbol
(r) which is “in the machine”. We may call this square the “scanned square”. The
symbol on the scanned square may be called the “scanned symbol”: : : : The possi-
ble behaviour of the machine at each moment is determined by the m-con7guration
qn and the scanned symbol (r). This pair qn; (r) will be called the “con7gura-
tion”: thus the con7guration determines the possible behaviour of the machine: : : :
If at each stage the motion of a machine: : : is completely determined by the con-
7guration, we shall call the machine an “automatic machine” (or a-machine): : : :
In this paper I deal only with automatic machines, and will therefore often omit
the pre7x a-. (pp. 117–118).
According to this characterization, a computational process is a sequence of stages,
and the machine’s con7guration—i.e., the condition of the machine, the position of the
scanner and the contents of the tape—at any stage 
+ 1 is completely determined by
the machine’s con7guration at the previous stage 
. Similarly, we can see the process
as a sequence of state-transition actions (see, e.g., [13]), whereas ‘state’ is taken in a
broad sense, referring to the machine’s con7guration. I will henceforth use the terms
‘con7guration’ and ‘state’ interchangeably.
As Copeland [9, p. 282] observes, there is not much mentioning of time in Turing’s
1936 characterization of the machines. There is a listing of the primitive operations, but
no speci7cation of their duration. The implicit assumption in the literature on compu-
tation is that there is a lower bound on duration of a primitive operation. In particular,
it is assumed that a process that consists of in7nitely many stages—in those cases
when the machine never halts—requires in7nite time. I will refer to the machines that
satisfy this assumption as ordinary TM. Accelerating TM are ordinary TM save one
di2erence. Their sequence of stages exhibits the temporal pattering mentioned above.
Copeland [9] who coined the name accelerating TM describes them as “Turing machine
that perform the second primitive operation called for by the program in half the time
taken to perform the 7rst, the third in half the time taken to perform the second, and
so on” (p. 283). This pattering enables the accelerating machines to complete the same
sequence of actions within a 7nite time, and so to perform super-tasks that ordinary,
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non-accelerating, machines cannot perform. There are, of course, many devices that
can do things that no TM can compute (for a useful survey see [10]). Even Turing
[26] conceives such devices, which he calls machines with oracles, or o-machines. Ac-
celerating TM are of special interest because they preserve the computational structure
of an ordinary TM, and yet seem to perform tasks that no ordinary TM can do.
One such task is generating the in7nite decimal expansion of : “Since a Turing
machines can be programmed to compute , an accelerating Turing machines can
execute each act of writing that is called for by this program before two moments
of operating time have elapsed. That is to say, for every n, the accelerating machine
writes down the nth digit of the decimal representation of  within two moments of
operating time” [9, p. 284]. Another task would be to arrive at the truth-values of open
questions in mathematics such as Wittgenstein’s question of whether or not there exist
three consecutive 7’s in the decimal representation of , or the question of whether or
not Goldbach’s conjecture is true [19,9]. Consider the latter conjecture, which asserts
that every even number larger than two is the sum of two primes. The accelerating
machine would operate as follows: its 7rst action is to print on the designated output
square the symbol 1 (TRUE). This action requires 1 min. It then systematically and
successively examines whether an even number is a sum of two primes. Simplifying
matters, we could assume it takes 12 min to test out 4, another
1
4 min to test out 6,
1
8 min to test out 8, and so forth. If the machine 7nds a counterexample, i.e., an even
number that is not a sum of two primes, it would replace the 1 with 0 (FALSE). If it
does not 7nd one, exhausting, as it were, all natural numbers, the machine would never
alter the 1 in the output square. One way or another, the machine would complete its
task within 2 min, providing the truth-value of Goldbach’s conjecture.
Our focus here is on accelerating TM whose task is to compute functions that cannot
be computed by any ordinary TM! A classic example is the halting function H (x; y),
which characterizes the halting states of the set of TM. H (x; y) returns 1 if the machine
whose index is x (in some enumeration of the set of TM) halts when operating on
input y, and returns 0 if the machine never halts. Turing [25] proved that no ordinary
TM computes this function; no TM, that is, solves the halting problem. But here is
an accelerating device that does. The device is a universal machine that operates as
follows. Its 7rst action is to print 0 in the designated output square. Operating as a
universal TM, our device then mimics the actions of the xth TM operating on input
y. The actions are performed in an accelerated fashion, such that after each operation
our device tests whether the mimicked machine arrived at a halting state. If arrived at
a halting state, the device replaces the 0 with 1 at the output square and halts. If not,
the device keeps working ad in7nitum, never replacing the 0 in the designated output
square. Either way, the device would tell within 2 min whether the xth TM, operating
on input y, halts or not for any given x and y. For a more detailed description of the
machine, see [8, p. 31].
There are arguments, however, against the physical and conceptual possibility of
super-tasks in general and accelerating machines in particular (for a critical survey, see
[18]). On the physical side, Benacerraf and Putnam [2, p. 20] point out that super-tasks
are physically impossible because relativity theory sets the velocity of light as a limit on
the speed at which the machine’s parts can move. This point is echoed by Gandy [13]
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who argues that there is a bound on the speed of signal propagation in any physical
computing device. But it turns out that there are spacetime structures consistent with
Einstein’s equations, where super-tasks are quite easy to come by ([19,16,17,21]; but
see also [11]). In these spacetime structures we can devise a non-accelerating o-machine
that computes functions that are not TM computable, including the halting function.
Yet Benacerraf and Putnam’s point does apply to the accelerating machines. There
must be an n, for which it is kinematically impossible to perform an action in less
than 12
n
of a minute. Even in the context of Newtonian mechanics, where the equations
enable the body’s velocity to increase without bound, this body would disappear from
the universe. So in the best case scenario, the accelerating machine would disappear
by the end of the process, leaving behind the correct results written on the memory
tape alone (see also [9, p. 289]).
On the conceptual side, Thomson [23] argues that super-tasks are conceptually im-
possible or at least that “the concept of super-task has not been explained” (p. 6).
We shall immediately turn to discuss the argument in length, in Section 3. Another
conceptual puzzle concerns the accelerating device that computes the halting function.
On the one hand, this device is, seemingly, “a Turing machine fair and square” [9,
p. 295]. On the other hand, it computes a function that cannot be computed by any
Turing machine. This certainly looks like “a blatant contradiction” [9, p. 295]. I return
to discuss this puzzle in Section 4. My aim here is to show that the two conceptual
paradoxes are linked, and that their resolution proceeds along the same lines.
3. Thomson’s paradox
Thomson [23] argues that there are “reasons for supporting that super-tasks are not
possible of performance” (p. 5). The gist of his argument is that we cannot intelligibly
determine what would be the state of the system after the completion of the super-
task. Thomson’s main example involves a reading lamp, but it can easily be extended
to accelerating machines (Thomson himself applies it to -machines). Consider an
accelerating machine that produces, successively, the partial sums of the in7nite series
1;−1; 1;−1; : : : : At the end of the 7rst stage, which lasts 1 min, the machine prints
out 1. At the second stage, lasting 12 min, the machine replaces the 1 by 0. At the third
stage, lasting 14 min the machine prints 1 instead of the 0, and so forth, ad in7nitum.
In short, the machine alternates from 0 to 1 and back again unboundedly. What would
be printed on the tape after 2min, when the machine completes its super-task? Is it 1
or 0? It cannot be 1, because the machine always prints 0 immediately after. And it
cannot be 0, because the machine always prints 1 immediately after. So, on the one
hand, the printout after 2min must be either 1 or 0. But, on the other, the printout can
be neither 1 nor 0. What is the way out of this paradoxical situation? The assumption
that there is a non-halting machine that computes the partial sums of the diverging
series is surely innocent. We must therefore blame the idea of a super-task which
seems to be self-contradictory, or at least has to be explained.
Thomson’s argument looks neat and convincing. But, as Benacerraf [1] demonstrates,
it is invalid. Thompson speci7ed the logical setup of the machine at every stage before
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2 min have elapsed. Given this speci7cation, we can tell what would be the actions
of the machine during that time period, when the super-task is performed. Yet nothing
follows from this speci7cation about the state of the machine at the 2-min stage. It
is like the function that is speci7ed to be continuous in the segment [0; 2), but is not
speci7ed at 2. The function might preserve its continuity at 2, but might lose it as
well. All values at 2 would be consistent with that speci7cation. Likewise, the printout
on the machine’s tape after 2min can be 0, 1, 17, or nothing at all. Each printout is
consistent with the speci7cation of the machine.
It is widely regarded that Benacerraf’s critique is successful; even Thomson [24]
later admitted that his own argument is worthless. But the critique is hardly reliev-
ing. Given how simple Benacerraf’s reply is, we might wonder why Thomson’s ar-
gument looked so neat and convincing in the 7rst place; “why so many naturally
conclude otherwise and as a result believe that a contradiction is straining to emerge”
[12, p. 238]. Furthermore, we are still puzzled about the state of the accelerating ma-
chine after the super-task is accomplished. As Copeland [9] puts it, “Thomson’s query
as to what state an in7nity machine may consistently be supposed to be in after it
completes its super-task is a good one” (p. 286). It is a good query because we are
still convinced that the printout on the machine’s tape after 2min depends on the prior
history of the machine, even if we haven’t speci7ed what the machine would do after
2min. So we wonder what could be printed out on the tape given that the previous
printouts form the diverging in7nite sequence 1; 0; 1; 0; : : : :
I suggest that we are puzzled because we are still drawn in by a picture that con-
1ates di2erent perspectives of the accelerating machine. One is the TM perspective.
According to this perspective, the accelerating machine is just a TM that computes, by
executing a suitable program, the partial sums of the diverging in7nite series, and thus
alternately prints 1 and 0 and back unboundedly. From that point of view, this accel-
eration process is an in7nite sequence of stages, whereas the machine’s con7guration
(state) at each stage is completely determined by the con7guration of previous stage.
According to a di2erent perspective, which I call the physical perspective, we view the
machine in terms of its physical makeup. From that perspective, the machine produces
physical tokens of 1s and 0s because its dynamics, governed by the laws of physics,
dictate this behavior. From this point of view, too, each state of the machine depends
on the prior history of the machine, only that here the relevant history is the physical
one. In particular, if the machine (or just the tape) somehow survives the acceleration
process, its state at the 2-min stage is dictated by its prior physical states. 1
1 I would like to emphasize that we could easily replace the physical perspective by any other which asserts
that the machine is in some state after accomplishing the super-task. I refer to the physical perspective both
because many (see, e.g., [9,12]) discuss the accelerating processes from that perspective, and because it is
easy to con1ate the physical and TM perspectives. It is easy because, along the acceleration process, the
physical device implements the TM. Similarly, we could replace the TM perspective by any other which
implies that the machine is a rule-following device, namely, that each machine’s state is determined by the
previous one. In Thomson’s main example—with the reading lamp—the ‘TM perspective’ implies that each
OFF-state is followed by an ON-state, and vice versa. The ‘physical perspective’ implies that the lamp is in
some state after 2 min.
110 O. Shagrir / Theoretical Computer Science 317 (2004) 105–114
Thomson’s paradox emerges when we con1ate the two perspectives. Taking the
physical perspective, we assert that the machine is in some state after 2 min. Tak-
ing the TM perspective, we assert that any machine’s state—its con7guration at this
stage—is completely determined by the previous state. We thus conclude that the ma-
chine’s con7guration after 2min is dictated by the previous TM’s con7guration. Yet we
cannot intelligibly tell what con7guration precedes the 2-min stage. For, as Thomson
convincingly shows, if it printed 1, the machine prints 0 immediately after, and if it
printed 0, the machine prints 1 immediately after. We thus cannot tell what would be
the printout on the tape after 2 min either. Thomson concludes that the fault is to be
found in the assumption that such a machine is conceptually possible. And since the
idea of a non-halting machine surely makes sense, Thomson concludes that the “talk
of super-tasks is senseless” [23, p. 9].
But the argument is 1awed. The 1aw is in taking the machine’s state, at the 2nd
min, to be not only a physical state, but also a Turing machine’s state, whereas, the
TM at that time is no longer speci7ed. The device, as a TM, completes all its actions
before the 2nd min. Even if the device survives the acceleration, its physical state after
2 min is no longer a TM’s state. All the in7nitely many states of the pertinent TM
were implemented at the time period prior to the 2nd min. But if the machine’s state,
after 2min, is not a TM’s state, it need not be dictated any longer by the previous state
of the TM we speci7ed. From the TM perspective, any machine’s state after 2 min
would be perfectly consistent with the accelerating TM that was in action during the
time segment [0; 2). Inconsistency emerges nowhere.
Setting the physical and TM perspectives apart, we see that no paradox emerges.
But we still wonder about the machine’s physical state after 2min, after the super-
task had been accomplished. We wonder whether we can consistently retain all the
following assertions about the physical setting of the machine: (1) that the machine is
in some physical state after completing the super-task; (2) that each state is dictated
by the prior physical history; and (3) that this physical history consists of alternat-
ing printing 1’s and 0’s on the tape. But as Earman and Norton [12, pp. 237–239]
point out, inconsistency emerges only when we implicitly introduce another assump-
tion, about persistence. The assumption is that the information on the machine’s tape
is left unchanged until the next printing operation. In particular, the printout on the
designated output square would be 0 as long as it was not replaced by 1, and vice
versa. This persistence property amounts to requiring that the information in the des-
ignated output square after 2min is the limit of printouts in that square prior to the
2ndmin [12, p. 238]. Assuming that, there cannot be an answer as to what would
be printed on that square after 2 min, simply because there is no limit to the se-
ries consisting of the states of the tape, prior to that time. Any attempt to con-
struct an accelerating device that successively produces 1’s and 0’s and that uses
the persistence property must fail. “The machine must be constructed to satisfy an
inconsistent speci7cation. This is clearly impossible in any consistent physical set-
ting” [12, p. 239]. However, we certainly cannot conclude that all other speci7cations
of super-task machines are also inconsistent. We can certainly specify, as we did in
Section 2, other accelerating machines that, arguably, satisfy persistence. And we can
specify an accelerating machine that alternately prints 0’s and 1’s, unboundedly, yet
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does not satisfy persistence at the 2-min stage. What would be the printout on the tape
after 2min, after the super-task is accomplished? It is certainly an interesting empirical
question. But given that persistence is not satis7ed, it is no longer a puzzling one.
4. Computing the uncomputable
Let us now turn to the other paradox: that of accelerating TM that compute func-
tions that no TM can compute. How are we to solve this paradox? One way out of the
conundrum is to deny that such a machine computes at all. Another is to distinguish
between di2erent senses of computing. Thus Copeland [9] argues that the halting prob-
lem refers to computation in the internal sense, and that the accelerating TM computes
the halting function only in the external sense. I do not contest these solutions but o2er
another instead. I urge that the same reasoning that led to Thomson’s paradox—a con-
1ation between TM and physical perspectives—also creates the current paradox, and so
that the same reasoning that liberated us from Thomson’s paradox also applies in the
current case. In particular, if we accept Benacerraf’s critique of Thomson’s paradox,
as we should, we must give up the idea that the machines that compute the halting
function, generating the in7nite expansion of , etc., are TM.
Consider again the accelerating device that computes the halting function. Recall
how it works: it 7rst prints 0, then simulates the acts of the nth machine receiving
m as an input, and replacing the 0 by 1 just in case the simulated machine halts at
some point. When the super-task is completed, after 2min, we have at our disposal the
halting status of the simulated machine. But who is computing the halting function?
If we take Benacerraf’s critique seriously, then the answer is that it is certainly not a
TM. We did specify an accelerating TM that simulates the acts of the nth TM (for any
n and m), yet all the acts of this TM take place before the 2nd min. Nothing follows
from this speci7cation about the state of the device after 2 min, when the super-task
is completed. Any printout on the machine’s tape after 2 min, be it 0; 1, or 17, is
perfectly consistent with the halting program that the machine executed before that. If
the accelerating TM does not halt, there is no point during the acceleration, at the time
segment [0; 2), at which the super-task has been accomplished. And after 2 min, when
the super-task has been 7nally completed, the TM’s state is no longer speci7ed.
So why do we take the device to compute the halting function? The reason, I
maintain, is that we also look at the device from another, most commonly a physical,
perspective. From that perspective, we assume, rightly or wrongly, that the device exists
after 2 min, and we also assume, rightly or wrongly, that the device’s tape persists in
its current physical state as long as there is no printing operation. Taken together, we
assume that the printout on the tape after 2min is the limit of the prior printouts on the
tape, at the time of acceleration. And given that these printouts represent the halting
state of the nth machine acting on input m, we take this limit to be no less than the
(physical) representation of the solution of the halting problem.
A paradox emerges only when we con1ate the TM and the physical perspectives.
Taking the TM perspective, we conceive the device as an accelerating TM that executes
the program described above. Taking the physical perspective, we maintain that the
112 O. Shagrir / Theoretical Computer Science 317 (2004) 105–114
device is in some state after 2 min. We thus conclude that the device’s state after
2min is a TM’s state that represents the value of a function that no TM can compute.
We are relieved when we realize that the device’s state after 2min is, at best, a physical
state, and not a TM’s state. We thus should conclude that if anything computes the
halting function, it is the physical device, not the TM. The accelerating TM computes
exactly the same function computed by a non-accelerating TM. It returns 1 if the
simulated nth machine halts, and never returns a value if the nth machine never halts.
The same reasoning applies to the other accelerating machines. Assuming that Gold-
bach’s conjecture is true, the accelerating TM will systematically check out every even
number. Yet nothing about the speci7cation of this TM dictates what would be the state
of the device after 2min. Any printout on the tape, be it 1 (TRUE) or 0 (FALSE)
or nothing at all, is consistent with the speci7ed TM. No TM generates the in7nite
decimal expansion of  either. The accelerating TM prints on the tape any digit of the
in7nite decimal expansion. But at no point during the acceleration the task is com-
pleted, and when the task had been accomplished, after 2 min, the device is no longer
the speci7ed TM.
Of course that we can extend the TM concept so that it will encompass the 2-min
stage. We can specify the value of the designated output at that moment to be the
limit of the previous values that this cell has displayed. Such speci7cation is o2ered
by Hamkins and Lewis [14,15], who introduce the concept of an in4nite time TM. This
machine preserves the static structure of an ordinary machine. Its successive steps of
computation also proceed in the classical manner: “the classical procedure determines
the con7guration of the machine: : : at any stage 
 + 1, given the con7guration at any
stage 
” [14, p. 526]. What is new is the behavior of the machine at the trans7nite
domain. At any limit ordinal stage, “the machine is placed in the special limit state,
just another of the 7nitely many states; and the values in the cells of the tapes are
updated by computing a kind of limit of the previous values that cell has displayed”
[14, p. 526]. We can thus have an accelerating in7nite time TM that computes the
halting function. The machine operates like a universal machine before 2 min have
elapsed. After printing 0 at the output square, it simulates the operations of the nth
machine operating on input m, replacing the 0 with 1 just in case the simulated machine
halts. During this period the machine behaves in the classical manner, meaning that
the con7guration of each stage is completely determined by the con7guration of the
previous stage. So far there is not much di2erence from the accelerating TM described
above. But there is a di2erence. The in7nite time machine also encompasses the 2-min
stage. This stage is a !1 limit stage, in which the value at the designated output cell
is the limit of the previous values in that cell, namely, displaying the halting state of
the nth machine, acting on input m. 2
I do not deny that this in7nite time TM computes the halting function. I also do not
mind the name in7nite time Turing machine. Rather, my point is this. If accelerating
TM have exactly the same computational structure as ordinary TM, then they compute
2 Other constructions, which retain the static structure of Turing machines, modifying only the end struc-
ture, can be made in terms of inductive TM [6] and limit TM [5]. These machines, too, can compute the
halting function.
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exactly the TM computable functions. Performing super-tasks enables the accelerating
machines to complete in7nitely many steps in a 7nite interval of time, but it does not
enable to compute functions that the ordinary machines cannot compute. And if ac-
celerating TM di2er from ordinary TM in computational structure, as is the case with
in7nite time TM, then they might have more computational power. But here too, the
di2erence in computational power is not due to performing super-tasks alone. Perform-
ing a super-task only ensures that the computation terminates in a 7nite real time, even
if it requires in7nitely many computation steps. The di2erence in computational power
owes to the di2erence in computational end structure. Either way, no paradox emerges.
If the accelerating TM has the same computational structure as the ordinary machine,
it does not compute the halting function. And if we extend the concept of the TM,
rede7ning the end structure, it should come as no surprise that the newly speci7ed TM
compute functions, e.g., the halting function, that Turing’s machines—the machines
that Turing speci7ed—fail to compute.
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